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It is rare to have an occasion to discuss one’s ideas with an interlocutor with the 
generosity and rigor of Graham Priest. I have genuinely enjoyed our exchange and 
how Priest has pushed me to clarify the scope of my analysis. In contemplating 
Priest’s reply and our informal correspondence, it has become clear to me that Priest 
and I share a great many ideas and orientations. For example, we both appear to be 
allergic to orthodoxy, i.e. gate-keeping that does not let in all “legitimate traders” 
[4]
1
. So, yes, it would seem that we both hold a concern that professional philosophy 
has an unpleasant proclivity towards the development and sustenance of orthodoxy. 
And, I assume, we are both committed to contributing towards understandings of 
professional philosophy that counter this proclivity.
2
  
  There are, however, points where Priest and I part company and these points of 
divergence are significant. For example and, perhaps, most significantly, Priest and I 
disagree on how our respective positions impose limitations on actual philosophical 
engagement. Where Priest’s article, “What is Philosophy?”, is specifically concerned 
with offering an account of philosophical engagement, my article, “How is this Paper 
Philosophy?”, is concerned with values that orient the institutionalization of 
philosophical engagement. There is a fundamental difference between having one’s 
analysis target the institutionalization of philosophical practice versus philosophical 
practice as such, a difference Priest acknowledges early in his reply [1]. However, 
this point of divergence is far more significant than Priest appears to appreciate. That 
is, a standard for a given practice functions very differently than a set of values aimed 
at orienting those standards. So, no, our accounts do not delimit in similar ways as  
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1
 The page numbers of Priest’s citation references in the current issue are given in bracket parentheses. 
2
 Priest is also correct in pointing out that different geographical locations have different professional 
philosophy cultures. It is for this reason in my original paper and in this reply I will confine my 
remarks to professional philosophy in a U.S. context. As such, all references to professional 
philosophy refer to professional philosophy within the U.S. 
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Priest claims, though we do both offer delimitations [8]. 
  In what follows, I will briefly develop significant convergences and divergences 
between Priest’s and my positions. The convergences illustrate a similar issue, i.e. 
lessening the effect of orthodoxy in professional philosophy, whereas the divergences 
illustrate a disagreement over the preferable strategy towards achieving this aim, i.e. 
the kind of delimiting strategy that would facilitate the lessening of orthodoxy. 
Ultimately, I indicate that when grappling with tendencies towards orthodoxy in a 
profession it is preferable to propose revisions at the level of institutionalization 
versus a standard at the level of practical engagement.  
 
1. THE YES: 
 
It should come as a surprise to no one that Priest is able to identify my paper, “How is 
this Paper Philosophy,” as philosophy according to his own standard of philosophy as 
critique. I received my philosophy training in the U.S, where criticism is still the 
“life-blood of the discipline” (Priest 2006, 203n9). So to this observation, I can but 
shrug my shoulders, agree, and point to a reality that may be startling for some, 
though clearly not Priest. I am not a paradigmatic example of the many varied diverse 
practitioners that I am championing. Though I am a black woman employed in 
professional, academic philosophy in the U.S., I know I am not, by far, representative 
of the most diverse philosophical practitioners.
3
 And though I may represent diversity 
in professional philosophy in many respects, the same could not be said of all points 
where differences become salient. What this indicates is that what counts as diversity 
in professional philosophy is a complicated affair, which Priest demonstrates an 
appreciation for with his extension of my observations to paraconsistent logic [4-5].  
 Priest is also correct in identifying my problem with orthodoxy. Orthodoxy here is 
defined as gate-keeping that does not let in all legitimate traders. Priest calls this kind 
of gate-keeping “unhealthy.” On this he and I agree [4]. I do have a problem with 
unhealthy gate-keeping or orthodoxy. We should all have a problem with orthodoxy, 
in my opinion, if for no other reason than, as Priest states, “orthodoxy is rarely right” 
[4]. In my paper, I attempt to demonstrate that professional philosophy in the U.S. 
shows the earmarks of a climate rife with unhealthy gate-keeping.
4
 Given that issues 
of diversity in professional philosophy are complicated and professional philosophy 
can be seen as riddled with orthodoxy, my project is to consider options for 
professional philosophical comportment that can address these two realities. As a 
result, I propose a shift in professional culture away from valuing narratives of 
legitimation to narratives of contribution, which I call a culture of praxis.
5
 
                                                 
3
 I think here of diverse practitioners like Africana philosophers Bill Lawson (2012), Leonard Harris 
(1997), Donna-Dale Marcano (2010), and John McClendon III (2012), to name a few, who all 
demonstrate diversity not only in their social identities, but in their methodologies, writing styles, 
and/or targeted research areas. 
4
 See also (Dotson 2011). 
5
 I use the term praxis here in line with U.S. black feminist deployment of the term to refer to the ways 
our actions and practice are infused with beliefs, desires, and theoretical orientation, but also to 
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2. THE NO: 
 
There are two important points of divergence between Priest’s position in his reply 
and his essay, “What is Philosophy?” and my paper, “How is this Paper Philosophy?” 
The first concerns the target of our inquiry, whereas the second concerns the kinds of 
delimitations our different accounts impose given our different targets. Priest, in 
answering the question, what is philosophy, offers a standard for philosophical 
engagement as such. In contrast, by inquiring into the question, how or in what 
manner a paper is philosophy, I propose a set of values that can orient the creation 
and application of standards for philosophical engagement. There is a difference 
between specifying philosophical engagement, i.e. proposing that philosophy is x, and 
orienting specifications of philosophical engagement, i.e. content and application of 
philosophical standards should accord with x value. The former performs the task of 
determining what counts as philosophy, whereas the latter orients such standards. 
Priest in taking criticism to be a fundamental feature of philosophy, offers a filter 
standard on philosophy and philosophical engagement. Whereas I, as Bo Mou 
indicates, address “meta-methodological/meta-philosophical” issues for professional 
philosophy (2012, 1). I am not aiming at providing specifications for philosophy as 
such, but rather a set of values that can orient such specifications and their 
application. The values I propose have a specific aim, however. They aim to enable 
greater diversity within professional philosophy in the U.S by providing a means for 
addressing persisting orthodoxy. In accordance with this difference, Priest and my 
account do not delimit in similar ways.  
  By providing a filter standard on philosophy as such, Priest offers a criterion that 
can be used to judge whether something is a certain kind.
6
 When Priest explains that 
he takes “critique to be a defining feature of philosophy,” he offers a filter standard 
for “philosophy” [8]. That is, what makes philosophy “philosophy” is critique. In 
contrast, I advocate a value and a point of recognition to orient standards for 
                                                                                                                                           
understand the ways that even the most obscure ideas once adopted can affect our actions and lives. 
For many black feminists, our actions and contributions are theory producing insofar as they both 
orient and transform our theoretical understandings of the world (Collins 2000, Cooper 1992).  And, in 
turn, our theories are actions producing (McClaurin 2001).  
  Now one would do well not to over simplify this orientation. It is not the case that every idea or 
inquiry needs to promote or encourage some specific course of action, though many theories do. 
Rather, it is an understanding that what questions become salient to us, what domains of inquiry prick 
our interests, or what kind of answers we seek do not emerge arbitrarily. They are often times pertinent 
to our, even if the “our” refers to “one’s own,” living. For example, I do not see the difference between 
“issues pertinent to our living” and “live matters” quite as clearly as Priest (p. 4-5). Even relatively 
obscure domains of inquiry are enabled by, at the very least, social conditions (e.g. the time and 
privilege to indulge in obscure inquiries), political conditions (e.g. the space to conduct one’s 
inquiries), and personal interests that render live matters “live.” In this vein, I see every inquiry as 
action in space, whether the inquiry recommends a particular action or not; and do not so clearly 
demarcate the difference between actions and theory production. I am not alone in this proclivity. It is 
a common U.S. Black feminist orientation, which, I admit, may have nothing in common with the 
Yugoslavian Praxis group (p4n6). 
6
 This understanding of “filter standard” borrows heavily from (Whyte and Thompson 2010, 80). 
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philosophy and the application of those standards. First, I advocate for a “value 
placed on seeking issues and circumstances pertinent to our living” for guiding the 
creation of standards themselves. Each issue and inquiry may have its own set of 
standards given the topic, audience, and goals of the research.  Second, I urge 
“recognition and encouragement of multiple canons and multiple ways of 
understanding disciplinary validation” for the application of standards. This includes 
the recognition that if the actual contributions we make have certain demands for 
engagement, then not all standards are equally applicable to all forms of philosophical 
engagement and, hence, cannot be applied universally (2012, 17). These values, 
however, are not standards aimed at identifying philosophical engagement itself, i.e. 
what is philosophy.  
  To say that I am not offering a standard for philosophical engagement itself does 
not mean I am not proposing a standard. I may, and I concede Priest’s point here, be 
offering a standard just the same. However, I am proposing a set of values that could 
act as a meta-standard, i.e. at the level of standards for philosophical engagement 
themselves. Hence, if a given standard does not demonstrate value placed on live 
matters and/or the application of a given standard does not include recognition of 
multiple canons and disciplinary validation, then it is not, according to my proposal, 
an appropriate standard, nor application of a standard for the institutionalization of 
philosophy. As such, the values I propose would impose restrictions. But they would 
restrict the creation and application of philosophical standards themselves. In this 
way, the set of values I propose would have an indirect effect on professional 
philosophical engagement, but they would not dictate precisely how philosophical 
engagement will manifest. The latter, I believe, is an unfortunate outcome of Priest’s 
conception of philosophy as critique. 
  So though delimitations exist in both Priest and my respective accounts, they do 
not delimit in the same way. It would be inappropriate to ask of every philosophy 
paper or project, does your paper place a value on live matters and/or does it 
recognize multiple ways of disciplinary validation. It would be appropriate, in my 
estimation, to inquire after a standard for philosophical engagement and every 
application of philosophical standards in this fashion. The same cannot be said of 
Priest’s understanding of philosophy as critique. It is unfortunate, though probably 
not intentional, that it would be appropriate to ask of every would-be philosophical 
paper or project if it includes or implies criticism.
7
 It would be, quite possibly, 
inappropriate to ask of every standard for philosophical engagement whether it 
includes or implies criticism. By placing restrictions on philosophy at the level of a 
philosophical practice, Priest and I are not playing the same game at all. His standard 
runs the risk of being taken as a universal, univocally relevant justifying norm for 
                                                 
7
 It is important to note that Priest does explain that every philosophical project does not have to be a 
critical one. He highlights the possibility of “a professional division of labour” between those who 
engage in critique and those who “who build the different views which make critique bite” (p.6 & 
2006, 206). However, that all aspects of philosophical engagement have to either offer a critique or 
imply a critique is still part of this conception of philosophy and is a particular orientation and strategy 
that may or may not be shared by all would-be philosophical practitioners. 
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philosophical practice, which, if adopted, would most likely produce an orthodoxy 
that would exclude philosophical practitioners inspired by Audre Lorde, for example.  
This is an unacceptable outcome. I know several philosophical practitioners who are 
Lordeian in ways that make Priest’s proposal unacceptable.  
  I openly concede that I am offering a delimiting standard, but it is a standard for 
standards. Hence, the difference in how our accounts offer restrictions is reflected in 
where our respective standards apply. Every project called “philosophy” would need 
to answer to Priest’s standard of philosophy as criticism, if it were taken to orient all 
philosophical engagement. By contrast, every standard for philosophical engagement 
would need to comply with my evaluative standard. I am fine with this implication.  
  
2. THAT SAID... 
 
Do my remarks mean that Priest’s account of philosophy as critique is horribly 
flawed? Not really. In fact, the differences between Priest’s and my projects illustrate 
a point I wanted to press in my paper, “How is this Paper Philosophy?” Priest’s 
account is not, by itself, problematic (Dotson 2012, 26). It only becomes problematic 
to the degree his understanding of philosophy as criticism is seen as a means for 
orienting the institutionalization of philosophy. It is a good description of some, quite 
possibly most, forms of philosophical engagement today. Should it be allowed to 
serve as a fundamental feature of all philosophical engagement, it would propagate 
“unhealthy” gatekeeping or orthodoxy [4] that would serve to quell important 
diversity, e.g. Lordean orientations. This observation does not appear to be 
incompatible with Priest’s own intent. He explains that he never intended his 
understanding of philosophy to be “wielded by an entrenched and elite orthodoxy” (p. 
8). To stop this from happening, however, I propose we place Priest’s account in 
perspective. It is not a universal standard. It is also compatible with my proposal for a 
culture of praxis. It is compatible with a value for contributing live issues and, as long 
as the interlocutor applying the standard is not overzealous, it is perfectly compatible 
with recognition of diverse canons and disciplinary validation. It is not a standard for 
all philosophical engagement, however. It is, as he explains, a part of philosophical 
engagement today that he takes to be more fundamental [8], though not every 
philosophical practitioner is going to agree with this, nor believe it their duty to 
critique it. And as long as we, professional philosophers, are sensitive to the places 
where his conception of philosophy is relevant and the places where it is not, then it 
strikes me Priest’s conception does little harm and a great deal of good. 
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